1. The latest 'J' class destroyers were receiving names beginning with 'N', but he would not have known that. They displaced 1765 tons, had a speed of 36 knots, and 6 4.7 inch guns. A Flower class corvette in contrast had a displacement of 1170 tons, a speed of 16.5 knots, and a single 4 inch gun. back
2. HMS Western Isles at Tobermory was the working up establishment for small escorts, under the command of Commodore (Vice-Admiral retd.) G O Stephenson. The training was demanding and made a deep impression on almost everyone who went through it. Heavy emphasis was placed on responsiveness to the unexpected. But a more conventional approach based on polished drills for a limited set of circumstances would probably not have prepared the ships companies so well in the month available. back
3. For an explanation see Richard Woodman's book Malta Convoys (published by John Murray, London, 2000) p219. Empire Guillemot was mostly carrying animal fodder, which like everything else was in short supply on Malta. Most supplies were transported to Malta in very heavily defended naval convoys, but in a brave experiment Empire Guillemot sailed alone, having come from Britain as part of OG73, and after being escorted in darkness through the Straits of Gibraltar by Jasmine and Gentian on 13/14 September 1941 she changed her identity again to Vichy French and even Italian before arriving safely in Malta under her true British colours. back
5. This was type 271 surface radar. back
6. This was probably north bound convoy SL 96 with 35 merchant ships under escort. back
7. Jasmine successfully persuaded the Admiralty that the reef was uncharted. The waters were well known to be treacherous for this reason. HMS Fritillary was less fortunate, their lordships taking the view that Jasmine's plight should have alerted her commanding officer to the danger. The grounding severely damaged the Asdic (sonar) dome on Jasmine's hull. back
8. The first such British operation of the war, the poor organisation of the stores for landing and the lack of proper facilities for doing so taught important lessons for future operations. A corvette with its limited deck space was of course wholly unsuited to the task it was given here. back
9. Kilindini at Mombasa, Kenya, became the base of operations for corvettes in the Indian Ocean. back
10. Because of the threat posed by Japanese carrier-borne aircraft and surface units and the commitment of the bulk of Royal Navy to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, the decision had been made to withdraw the Eastern Fleet across the Indian Ocean out of harm's way. back
11. Until April 1942 there were no U-boats operating in the Indian Ocean, but following a successful reconnaissance the decision was made to send regular patrols to the area. back
12. Presumably convoy WS 26 with ships bound for Aden and Bombay. back
13. The officer of the watch would doubtless have been fully aware that a type IX U-boat had only 4 bow tubes but miscounting of tracks was common. In truth, since the majority of torpedoes used by U-boats were electric and left no easily visible wake, few ships could be sure of a U-boat attack unless the torpedo actually hit. back
14. A misplaced belief in the event. back